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Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company v. Greytak; Adopting the
Notice-Prejudice Rule and Clarifying Misinterpretations
Kristin Zadick
I. INTRODUCTION
Seeking to clarify past decisions and protect insureds’ rights to
insurance coverage, the Montana Supreme Court formally adopted the
notice-prejudice rule in third party coverage disputes in Atlantic Casualty
Insurance Company v. Greytak.1 However, in doing so, the Court failed
to fully reconcile the decision with prior case law regarding the noticeprejudice issue.
A. Factual and Procedural History
In March 2010, GTL brought suit in state court against Greytak
for non-payment of construction work.2 In April 2010, Greytak notified
GTL of its grounds for counterclaims for construction defects, and in
November Greytak filed the counterclaims against GTL.3 During the
construction work, Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”)
insured GTL under a commercial general liability policy that required
GTL to notify Atlantic as soon as practicable of any claim or suit brought
against the insured or any offense that might result in a claim.4 GTL
failed to notify Atlantic of the 2010 suit or the counterclaims brought by
Greytak. In April 2011, GTL and Greytak entered a settlement agreement
requiring GTL to notify Atlantic of Greytak’s counterclaims.5 The
agreement provided three courses of action: (1) GTL agreed if Atlantic
did not defend the case or file an insurance coverage action to dispute
coverage, GTL would allow judgment to be entered in favor of Greytak
for $624,685.14, plus costs; (2) if Atlantic assumed the defense, Greytak
agreed to seek recovery only from Atlantic and ensure that GTL would
not be responsible for any judgment; and (3) GTL and Greytak agreed if
Atlantic filed a coverage action, Greytak would defend with the purpose
of establishing coverage for GTL. GTL informed Atlantic of Greytak’s
counterclaims in May 2011, one year after Greytak notified GTL of its
grounds for the counterclaims.6
In January 2012, Atlantic brought a declaratory action in federal
district court, arguing it was not required to defend GTL because GTL
350 P.3d 63, 67 (Mont. 2015).
Id. at 64.
Id.
4
Id. at 65.
5
Id. at 64.
6
Id.
1
2
3
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violated the timely notice provision of the insurance policy. The federal
district court granted Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment. 7 Relying
on Steadele v. Colony Insurance Company,8 the court held an insurer
need only demonstrate the insured failed to comply with the notice
provision to avoid its duties to the insured, not that the insurer suffered
prejudice from the untimely notice. Accordingly, the court found
Atlantic did not have a duty to defend or indemnify GTL because
Greytak’s April 2010 notification to GTL of its grounds for
counterclaims triggered the notice provision, and GTL’s notice to
Atlantic a year later violated the timely notice policy provision.9 Greytak
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.10 Because
both parties relied on Steadele for opposing arguments,11 and because the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no Montana decisions that resolved
the issue of whether an insurer must show prejudice from untimely
notice to avoid its duties, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the
notice-prejudice question to the Montana Supreme Court.12
B. The Majority Holding
In a unanimous decision, the Montana Supreme Court formally
adopted the notice-prejudice rule in the context of third-party insurance
coverage disputes.13 According to the rule, an insured’s technical failure
to comply with the timely-notice requirement of a policy does not
automatically terminate coverage. Instead, the insurer must demonstrate
it suffered prejudice from the untimely notice in order to avoid its duties
to defend and indemnify the insured.14 The majority began its analysis
with a review of cases that have considered the rule under Montana law,
and detailed the policy considerations that arise when considering
insured coverage disputes.15
Greytak, 350 P.3d at 65.
260 P.3d 145, 150 (Mont. 2011).
Greytak, 350 P.3d at 65.
10
Id.
11
Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Greytak, 755 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), certifying question to the
Montana Supreme Court, 350 P.3d 63 (Mont. 2015) (Atlantic argued the Montana Supreme Court
addressed timely notice provisions in Steadele and did not impose a prejudice requirement. Greytak
responded that Montana law requires the insurer to demonstrate prejudice from the untimely notice,
relying on the discussion of prejudice in Steadele as proof of the rule’s prior application.).
12
Id. at 1129.
7
8
9

Greytak, 350 P.3d at 68 (Although Justice Rice and Justice McKinnon wrote separate
concurrences both arguing for an extension to the majority’s holding, all the Justices agreed on the
adoption of the notice prejudice rule).
14
Id. at 67.
15
Id. at 65–67 (citing State Farm Ins. Co. v. Murnion, 439 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1971); Sorensen v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1996); Steadele v. Colony Ins. Co., 260 P.3d 145 (Mont.
2011)).
13
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In its analysis, the majority explained the Court previously
applied the notice-prejudice rule in Steadele, even though the analysis
did not expressly mention the rule.16 In Steadele, the insurer did not
receive notice of a lawsuit involving its insured until several months after
a default judgment of $1.8 million had been entered against the insured.17
The Court in Steadele reasoned that because the insurer did not receive
timely notice of the claim, it suffered prejudice because it was deprived
of the ability to investigate the claim and participate in the lawsuit.18
Although the Steadele Court held the insured’s failure to provide timely
notice to the insurer relieved the insurer of its obligations, the majority in
Greytak argued Steadele is not a renunciation of the notice-prejudice
rule. Rather, the Court analyzed the prejudice issue by considering how
the late notice affected the insurer’s ability to protect its interests. The
Steadele Court considered the prejudice suffered by the insurer and
applied the rule in favor of the insurer.19
To support its decision, the majority in Greytak addressed the
policy considerations that support adoption of the notice-prejudice rule,
namely the policies to extend insurance coverage when faced with
disputes and to avoid automatic coverage loss by excusing technical
policy breaches.20 The Court held a failure to comply with a notice
provision does not preclude coverage, reasoning the “public policy of
Montana is to narrowly and strictly construe insurance exclusions
because they are ‘contrary to the fundamental protective purpose’” of
insurance.21 Applying the notice-prejudice rule, the Court held an insurer
must demonstrate it suffered prejudice from the insured’s untimely
notice before the insurer can deny coverage. Under the majority’s
rationale, an insurer must demonstrate it suffered prejudice even after the
insured enters a settlement agreement contrary to the insurer’s interests
and without the insurer’s knowledge.22
C. Justice Rice and Justice McKinnon’s Concurrences
While Justice Rice and Justice McKinnon agreed with the formal
adoption of the notice-prejudice rule, both argued the majority should
have extended its holding to declare Atlantic suffered prejudice from the
untimely notice and was therefore relieved of its duties to defend and
indemnify GTL.23
Id. at 66.
Steadele, 260 P.3d at 147–148.
18
Id. at 151.
19
Greytak, 350 P.3d at 66.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 67 (quoting Steadele, 260 P.3d at 149).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 67 (Rice, J., concurring), 69 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
16
17

2015

ADOPTING THE NOTICE-PREJUDICE RULE

235

Reasoning the timely notice provision and the delay experienced
by Atlantic were similar to those in Steadele, Justice Rice argued the
majority should applied the notice-prejudice rule in favor of Atlantic,
like the Court did in Steadele.24 Much like the insured in Steadele,
Greytak and GTL litigated the case without the involvement or
knowledge of Atlantic and entered a settlement agreement that allowed
for a judgment against GTL of over $600,000.25 Justice Rice argued the
majority should have analyzed the prejudice suffered by Atlantic
following the settlement agreement and held that GTL’s failure to notify
Atlantic resulted in a loss of coverage.26 To support his argument, Justice
Rice noted the purpose of the notice-prejudice rule is to protect insureds
from the harsh effects of a technical breach, not to allow insureds to
litigate claims and enter settlements without the knowledge or
involvement of the insurer.27
In her concurrence, Justice McKinnon agreed with Justice Rice’s
analysis that Atlantic suffered prejudice as a matter of law. However, as
in Estate of Gleason v. Central United Life Insurance Company,28 Justice
McKinnon called for an exception to the notice-prejudice rule that
presumes an insurer suffers prejudice when the insured fails to notify the
insurer of a lawsuit until after judgment has been entered against the
insured.29 Justice McKinnon argued the entry of judgment prejudices the
insurer because the the insurer is denied the ability to “investigate,
defend, control, or settle the suit,” and the majority’s requirement that an
insurer must demonstrate additional prejudice after the entry of judgment
strays from the protective purpose of the notice-prejudice rule.30
Specifically, the insured’s delay in notification until after judgment has
been entered is not a technical breach; the delay renders the timely notice
provision ineffective by depriving the insurer of its rights to defend
against the claim and participate in the suit.31
II. ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY HOLDING
As a threshold matter, the majority’s decision to adopt the
notice-prejudice rule is correct. The Court’s extension of the noticeprejudice rule to third-party coverage is likely not subject to dispute, due
to the unanimity of the Court’s decision and the longstanding practice to

Id. at 67–68 (Rice, J., concurring).
Id. at 68.
26
Id. at 67.
27
Id.at 68.
28
350 P.3d 349, 370 (McKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29
Greytak, 350 P.3d at 69 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 69–70.
24
25
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apply the principles of the notice-prejudice rule under Montana law.32
When confronted with insurance coverage disputes, courts must balance
the interests of insurers and the rights of insureds. By formally adopting
the notice-prejudice rule, the majority extended coverage to insureds,
despite a procedural breach of the insurance policy, and reinforced the
policy under Montana law to uphold an insured’s right to coverage. The
Court’s formal adoption of the notice-prejudice rule clarified not only the
status of the notice-prejudice rule, but also the rights and responsibilities
of insureds and insurers. In its analysis, the Court relied on public policy
considerations and contract law principles to extend the rule to its current
status. Although Greytak corresponds with the tendency to extend
coverage, the analyses used in Steadele and Greytak conflict, and
although the majority clarified the status of the notice-prejudice rule, the
majority failed to fully reconcile the two decisions.
A. Public policy considerations and anti-forfeiture principles support
adoption of the notice-prejudice rule
Although insurance policy provisions that require the insured to
notify the insurer of a claim as soon as possible are given effect under
Montana law,33 a provision that denies coverage for which the insured
pays consideration violates public policy.34 Motivated by the preference
to uphold insureds’ rights, Greytak gives effect to valid insurance policy
provisions and extends insurance coverage when a breach of the policy
causes no prejudice to the insurer. The majority conceded satisfaction of
a notice requirement is a “condition precedent” to an insurer’s liability,
and failure to satisfy the condition may result in a loss of coverage.35
However, to reconcile the competing interests of insurance carriers and
consumers, Montana law excuses untimely notice under certain
circumstances.36 The Greytak decision relied on public policy
considerations to adopt the notice-prejudice rule, reasoning the denial of
coverage for a procedural breach that causes no prejudice to the insurer
violates the “fundamental protective purpose” of insurance.37 Allowing
an insurer to escape its obligations to its insured contradicts the
See Murnion, 439 F.2d at 947 (upholding a district court ruling that under Montana law, an
insured must demonstrate it suffered prejudice from the delay in notification); Sorenson v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Mont. 1996) (holding that “absent some showing of material
prejudice” to the insurer, coverage may not be precluded on a technicality); XL Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Patrol Helicopters, Inc., No. CV-08-73-BU-RFC-JCL, 2009 WL 4929261, at *1 (D. Mont.)
(predicting the Montana Supreme Court would require the insurer to demonstrate prejudice before it
could avoid liability based on the insurer’s failure to provide timely notice of a claim).
33
Murnion, 439 F.2d at 947.
34
Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 67 P.3d 892, 899–900 (Mont. 2003).
35
Murnion, 439 F.2d at 947.
36
Id. (“delay in reporting is excusable when the accident is trivial, results in no apparent harm and
furnishes no reasonable ground for the insured to believe that a claim might arise”).
37
Swank Enters. Inc. v. All Purpose Servs., Ltd., 154 P.3d 52, 57 (Mont. 2007).
32
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expectations of consumers and violates public policy considerations
meant to protect consumers.
To reach a balance between the competing interests of insurers
and insureds, the majority analogized the denial of coverage following
untimely notice to the concept of forfeiture from contract law. Under
Montana law, insurance policies are contracts subject to the principles of
contract law,38 and courts generally construe insurance policies in favor
of the insured and in favor of extending coverage.39 Although contract
provisions requiring timely notice of claims are interpreted as conditions
precedent to the insurer’s duty to provide coverage,40 contract law
excuses the non-occurrence of a condition if the non-occurrence would
result in a windfall to the insurer and an unjust loss of rights, or
forfeiture, to the insured.41 The automatic loss of coverage following
untimely notice can amount to an unjust forfeiture because the insured
loses the insurance coverage for which he has paid consideration and the
insurer is relieved of its obligations under the policy but suffers no harm
from the untimely notice. Analogizing the loss of coverage to forfeiture,
the notice-prejudice rule excuses untimely notice when the notice does
not prejudice the insurer. The adoption of the notice-prejudice rule
advances the protective purpose of insurance and conforms to the
principles of forfeiture in contract law.
B. The Steadele Misinterpretation
Although adoption of the notice-prejudice is consistent with
public policy considerations announced in prior decisions, the rule
conflicts with the Court’s treatment of untimely notice in Steadele.
Despite the similarities between the timely notice requirements and the
delays experienced by the insurers, the Court applied different standards
to the notice-prejudice question in Greytak and Steadele. Although the
Greytak decision recognized the confusion,42 the Court failed to fully
address this inconsistency and reconcile the two decisions. While the
Greytak majority argued Steadele applied the notice-prejudice rule in
favor of the insurer,43 the treatment of the untimely notice in Steadele
paralleled an exception to the traditional rule called for by Justice
McKinnon: notice to the insurer after judgment has been entered
prejudices the insurer and relieves the insurer of its liability.44 The Court
Fisher ex rel. McCartney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 305 P.3d 861, 868 (Mont. 2013).
Steadele, 260 P.3d at 149.
Murnion, 439 F.2d at 947.
41
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1979); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 28–1–408
(2015) (“A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose
benefit it is created.”).
42
Id. (“Steadele should not be read to renounce the notice-prejudice rule.”).
43
Greytak, 350 P.3d at 66.
44
Id. at 69 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
38
39
40
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in Steadele did not require the insurer to demonstrate it suffered
prejudice. Rather, the Court noted that prejudice existed following the
late notice and entry of judgment.45 Although the traditional noticeprejudice rule requires the insurer to prove it suffered prejudice from the
insured’s untimely notice, the Court in Steadele reasoned the insured’s
timely notice was a condition precedent to coverage, and a failure to
provide such notice barred the insured’s recovery.46 The Steadele
decision held an insurer need only prove the insured provided notice
after judgment has been entered, not that the insurer must demonstrate
how the untimely notice prejudiced the insurer.47 Although the Court
used Greytak to clarify the status of the notice-prejudice rule, the Court
does not clarify whether Steadele analyzed untimely notice under an
exception to the rule. To reconcile the two decisions, the Court should
have addressed the inconsistency, rather than assert Steadele does not
stand for what it has been interpreted it to mean.48 To resolve the
inconsistency, the Court should have either recognized it presumed
prejudice in Steadele under an exception to the notice-prejudice rule and
adopted the exception that an insurer suffers prejudice as a matter of law
when the insured gives late notice of a claim after judgment is entered, or
the Court should have reconciled the conflicting analyses used in the two
decisions by distinguishing Greytak from Steadele.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Montana Supreme Court’s adoption of the noticeprejudice rule in Greytak was the correct decision considering the history
of the notice-prejudice requirement and the policy to protect insureds
from coverage loss, the decision does not clarify the Court’s treatment of
untimely notice in Steadele. In the situation where an insured fails to
notify the insurer of a claim and enters a settlement agreement contrary
to the insurer’s interests, it is unclear whether the insurer must make an
additional showing of prejudice beyond that of the lost opportunity to
participate in the defense and resolution of the claim. Going forward,
late notice and forfeiture of policy benefits will continue to be analyzed
from the perspective of prejudice. However, because the Court stopped
short of announcing that prejudice will be presumed when notice comes
Steadele, 250 P.3d at 151.
Id. at 150.
47
Id. at 151. (“[B]ecause Colony did not receive notice of the claim, Colony was prejudiced in that it
was deprived of the ability to investigate, to locate witnesses, to appoint counsel, to engage in
discovery, to negotiate a settlement, and to develop a trial strategy.”).
48
See Appellee’s Answer Brief at 4, Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Greytak, 350 P.3d 63 (Mont. 2015) (No. OP
14-0412) (arguing that under Steadele, an insurer is not required to show prejudice); Atl. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. GTL, Inc., 915 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1175 (D. Mont. 2013) (interpreting Steadele to mean an
insured’s failure to comply with a timely notice requirement in an insurance contract bars recovery
under the policy).
45
46
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after a settlement agreement or judgment has been entered, insurers bear
the burden of proving prejudice on a case-by-case basis.

